I. INTRODUCTION
Wildlife plays an integral role in the socioeconomic wellbeing of people around the world through the provision of hunting opportunities. Hunting is a common activity undertaken by millions of people, and the associated benefits are multiple, including meat, recreation, and cultural and religious values (CORDIS 2013) . In a review of valuation studies applied to hunted wildlife across the world, Häggmark-Svensson et al. (2015) conclude that the value of recreational hunting can be large in monetary terms, and in developing countries hunting can account for a considerable share of household income. However, the importance of hunting is not restricted to hunters, as the sale of hunting leases and fees also generates significant revenues to landowners (Lundhede, Jacobsen, and Thorsen 2015) . Moreover, hunting is important to farmers and forest owners as a means for keeping wildlife populations under control in order to reduce browsing damages to agriculture and forests (Rollins, Heigh, and Kanetkar 2004) .
The presence of different stakeholders with varying interests raises the issue of the appropriate policy instruments necessary to balance the costs and benefits generated by wildlife. The answer depends on the extent to which markets internalize the costs and benefits of wildlife, including, for example, the hunting benefits generated by different game species. The degree of internalization depends also on the functioning of markets for hunting-related activities. For example, hunting lease prices would in a well-functioning market provide landowners with a signal that informs about the economic benefits of measures to improve a hunting plot and reflect the trade-off between increased wildlife populations to enhance hunting values vis-à-vis the cost of the associated wildlife damages (Lundhede, Jacobsen, and Thorsen 2015) .
Hunting entails significant intrinsic values, and the properties of the market for hunting leases are not well known. Nevertheless, it is possible to estimate such values and identify market properties using relevant economic techniques. The two main methods used in valuation of hunting are the revealed preference and stated preference approaches. The revealed preference approach infers economic values of different attributes based on observed behavior of economic agents in an actual market. Studies using this approach measure use values, that is, values associated with active utilization of the resource, such as meat and recreational values of hunting. Only a few studies use the hedonic price method, applied to estimate the value of white-tailed deer hunting in the United States (Livengood 1983; Knoche and Lupi 2012) and roe and red deer hunting in Denmark (Lundhede, Jacobsen, and Thorsen 2015) . A comparatively larger number of studies use the travel cost method (Häggmark-Svensson et al. 2015) . For example, Knoche and Lupi (2013) use the travel cost method for valuation of a small game species, the ruffed grouse. We are not aware of any other studies that apply the revealed preference approach for the valuation of common European species such as moose, fallow deer, and wild boar.
Stated preference methods, on the other hand, value nonmarket goods by eliciting consumer preferences directly, using hypothetical markets. The approach measures both use and nonuse economic values, with contingent valuation and choice experiments as the most widely used methods in valuation of wildlife (Horne and Petäjistö 2003; Boman et al. 2011; Boman and Mattsson 2012; Häggmark-Svensson et al. 2015) . For instance, Boman et al. (2011) use the contingent valuation method to analyze the development of hunting values for moose in Sweden, using two datasets from 1987 and 2006 . Their results show a significant increase in moose hunting value over the period. Most stated preference studies are applied to a single species. An exception however, is a study by Engelmann, Lagerkvist, and Gren (2016) , where the value of moose, roe deer, and wild boar are simultaneously estimated using the choice experiment approach.
In addition to the literature on valuation of game species, studies on hunting lease prices and how they are determined are also of relevance to our paper. Examples of such studies include those by Meilby et al. (2006) , Rhyne, Munn, and Hussain (2009) , Hussain et al. (2010) , Munn et al. (2011) , and Lundhede, Jacobsen, and Thorsen (2015) . Despite the differences in the structure of the hunting markets analyzed, the studies reveal that factors such as the number of wildlife harvested, and the location and attributes of the hunting plot are significant determinants of hunting lease prices.
The aim of this paper is to estimate the economic value of game species to hunters by disentangling these values from other factors that affect hunting lease prices. To achieve this goal, a hedonic price model is used to estimate the demand for hunting leases in Sweden, and from this model the average marginal implicit hunting values are calculated. We note that the available literature on hedonic price models for hunting leases is silent on the possible spatial dynamics in the hunting lease prices. Meanwhile, recent advances in the literature on hedonic price models in general suggest that amenity prices often tend to be spatially correlated (Brasington and Hite 2005) . This suggests that accounting for such spatial interactions is important for obtaining robust estimates. In line with the above, this paper contributes to the literature on hunting leases and economic valuation of game by demonstrating the effects of spatial spillovers in lease prices on the estimated implicit hunting values. We also add to the literature by simultaneously estimating revealed hunting values for several common European species, using the hedonic pricing approach, thereby providing revealed values of fallow deer and wild boar.
Our findings indicate that the value of fallow deer is in the range of $287 to $324 per animal harvested, while the value of wild boar is between $279 and $290 per animal harvested. This can be interpreted as the hunters' willingness to pay for one unit of the respective species harvested. These values are the hunters' use values, which do not take into account, for example, the value that other forest visitors may attach to spotting wildlife. Also, there are significant spatial spillovers in the equilibrium hunting lease prices across municipalities, implying that the scope for landowners to exert monopoly power in the market is limited. Further, we observe that factors such proximity to large cities and the number of hunters in a hunting team are significant factors driving equilibrium hunting lease prices in the study area.
II. THE HUNTING LEASE MARKET IN SWEDEN
Recreational hunting is popular in Sweden, and hunters spend a significant amount of income and time on hunting (Fredman et al. 2010) . There are about 300,000 hunters who spend on average 20 days per year on hunting (Ericsson et al. 2010; Boman et al. 2011) . The annual gross hunting value is estimated to be in the neighborhood of $460 million (Mattson, Boman, and Ericsson 2008) .
The right to hunt in Sweden is tied to land ownership rights. Any landowner has the exclusive right to hunt on his or her own land. If the landowner does not want to hunt, the right can be leased out in whole or in part (Sandström, Wennberg-Di, and Ö hman 2013) . The person who possesses the hunting right also has the right to the game meat.
The Swedish hunting market includes both long-term leases of hunting land, typically on an annual basis or for several years, and shortterm leases on a daily or weekly basis. The long-term leases dominate the market, and short-term leases are offered only on a smaller scale by large landowners such as large forest companies, the Church of Sweden, and municipalities. Generally, a long-term lease implies that the landowner grants a team of hunters, hereafter referred to as a hunting team, the right to hunt all species on the land. For most species, the hunting team is free to decide on the harvesting strategy, as long as wildlife damage to agricultural and forest crops is held within reasonable limits (Ministry of Industry 1997). For moose hunting, other rules apply: here, hunting is required by law to be coordinated across the so-called moose management areas, where hunters, landowners, and representatives of the county administration jointly decide on harvesting strategies (Sandström, Wennberg-Di, and Ö hman 2013) . The ultimate aim of this regulation is to balance the hunting benefits and the forest damages incurred by the moose.
Hunting occurs to some extent on most land where it is legally permitted. Much of the hunting is carried out by hunting teams. There are no official registers of hunting teams, their members, or their hunting leases, but a survey by the Ministry of Industry (1997) suggests that approximately half of the hunters obtain access to hunting plots through leases, while 20% hunt on their own property, and 30% are invited by someone having the hunting right.
Hunting teams are typically very stable over time (Ministry of Industry 1997; Ericsson et al. 2010) . When there are free places within a hunting team, these places are usually filled with relatives and friends. Large forest companies sometimes offer hunting leases to employees, or on the basis of waiting lists. Less than 1% of hunters have found their hunting land on an open market through advertising or tenders (Ministry of Industry 1997).
Hunting lease prices vary across the country (Ministry of Industry 1997). In a twicerepeated survey of hunting lease prices among large Swedish land owners (large forest companies, the Swedish Church, municipalities, and manors), it is concluded that the majority of the respondents believe that higher game availability, more game diversity, and proximity to urban areas imply a higher lease price, whereas the presence of established carnivore populations, large roads, and unsuitable land consolidation imply lower lease prices (Lönnqvist 2011; Sandström, Wennberg-Di, and Ö hman 2013) . Lease contracts can be written or informal. A Danish study suggests that long-term and written formal contracts are associated with higher lease prices (Lundhede, Jacobsen, and Thorsen 2015) , and it seems reasonable that this applies also Swedish conditions.
A hunting team usually consist of a couple of hunters who pool their resources to acquire the lease to a hunting plot. Individual hunters can, on a voluntary basis, be members of a local hunters' association. In most cases, there is one local hunting association per municipality, but occasionally there can be more than one per municipality.
Game Species in Sweden
There are four major ungulate game in Sweden: moose (Alces alces), fallow deer (Dama dama), roe deer (Capreolus capreolus), and wildboar (Sus scrofa). The moose is the largest of these, weighing 200 kg to 550 kg, with a shoulder height of about 2 m. The species is spread over the whole country. Approximately 100,000 moose are shot every year, after which a population of 200,000 to 300,000 is left (Bergström and Danell 2009 It has a very slow dispersal rate and is typically present in large numbers in limited areas. About 17,000 fallow deer are harvested per year, while the population is about five times larger (Bergström and Danell 2009) . The species causes some browsing damage to forests but has a strong preference for agricultural crops.
The roe deer is comparatively small, with a a shoulder height of 0.70 m to 0.75 m, weighing 20 kg to 30 kg. It is present across the whole country, and the annual harvest is about 100,000, with a population that is three to four times that number (Bergström and Danell 2009) . It prefers forest habitats and causes some browsing damage to forests.
The wildboar was eradicated for two hundred years but has reestablished and dispersed quickly in southern and central Sweden since the 1970s. It can weigh 70 kg to 225 kg, with a shoulder height of up to 1 m. More than 25,000 wildboar are shot each year, and the population is less than twice that number (Bergström and Danell 2009) . It causes considerable burrowing damage to agricultural crops (Clarin and Karlsson 2010) , but it is unknown whether it causes any substantial damage to forests.
III. CONCEPTUAL MODEL
In this section we present a brief exposition on the determination of hunting lease prices. First, wildlife can give rise to both costs and benefits to landowners. For example, there are costs resulting from the browsing and burrowing activities of wildlife, which reduce the productivity of farming and forestry, but there are also benefits from wildlife viewing and hunting (Rollins, Heigh, and Kanetkar 2004) . Hunters derive benefits from wildlife when hunting. If the hunting right is transferred from the land owner to a hunting team, the land owner will forgo the benefits of hunting and hence requires at least compensation for this loss.
Due to the large number of landowners and hunters in Sweden, we assume that hunters and landowners are price takers on the hunting lease market. In a perfectly competitive market, equilibrium prices are determined by the convergence between the bid and offer prices of buyers and sellers, respectively (Rosen 1974; Palmquist 1989) . The offer price is here defined as the minimum amount of money a landowner is willing to accept in order to transfer the right to hunt on his land to the hunter. Similarly, the hunters' bid price is defined as the maximum amount of money the hunter is willing to pay in order to obtain the right to hunt on the hunting plot. The bid and offer prices, though separately determined, reflect the intrinsic preferences of the respective agents for every attribute of the hunting plot, including the bag rate of wildlife. In order words, the hunter seeks to maximize his welfare by bidding as little as possible for every attribute, while the landowner seeks to maximize her net returns by extracting the highest price possible for every unit of attribute of the land (Rosen 1974; Lundhede, Jacobsen, and Thorsen 2015) . This implies that the bid and offer prices are functions of land attributes, such as game harvests, wildlife populations, the size and location of the hunting plot, and the type of game habitats provided, and the intrinsic characteristics of the landowner and hunter. The equilibrium lease price will therefore reflect the value of land attributes, and the implicit value of game harvests will, ultimately, be determined by the net values that accrue from hunting. The equilibrium lease prices of the hunting plots are determined on the market by supply and demand for hunting plots with different potential for game harvests and various other attributes, and the market prices operate to ensure that excesses in demand and supply for hunting plots with each set of attributes are eliminated via price adjustments (Palmquist 1989) .
IV. METHODOLOGY, DATA, AND STUDY AREA Empirical Model
To analyze the determinants of hunting lease prices and the associated implicit prices, we use the hedonic price approach. This involves estimating a reduced-form model from which implicit prices of each attribute can be obtained by taking the partial derivative of the equation with respect to that attribute. Based on the empirical literature on hedonic price valuation of hunting (e.g., Livengood 1983; Meilby et al. 2006; Rhyne, Munn, and Hussain 2009; Lundhede, Jacobsen, and Thorsen 2015) , we specify our empirical model in reduced form as shown in equation [1] :
where refers to the log of the lease price ln P it per hectare that is paid by a hunting team in municipality i at time t. The choice of explanatory variables is motivated by previous studies in the literature, such as those by Livengood (1983), Meilby et al. (2006) , and Lundhede, Jacobsen, and Thorsen (2015) . The variable is a vector of game harvests. H it Here, we consider moose, fallow deer, roe deer, and wild boar harvests. If the hunting value of the game is positive, a larger harvest will be associated with a higher lease price. Further, is a vector of land attributes that Z it include the size of the hunting plot, the distance from the plot to the nearest large city, the type of land owner, and the proportion of the hunting plot that is open land. Studies such as those by Little and Berrens (2008) , Rhyne, Munn, and Hussain (2009) , and Lundhede, Jacobsen, and Thorsen (2015) suggest that the distance to the nearest large city is a reasonable proxy for the cost of travel time and hence the opportunity cost of time for urban hunters to reach the plot. If the opportunity cost of reaching a plot is high for many prospective hunters, the total demand for that plots is lower, as local hunters do not have to compete with urban ones. Consequently, we hypothesize that a large distance from urban areas implies a lower lease price. A survey by the Ministry of Industry (1997) indicates that forest companies might charge a relatively higher lease price. A land ownership dummy is therefore included to test whether there are any systematic differences between the lease prices charged by large forest companies relative to small landowners and municipalities. To capture landscape characteristics, which are partly under the control of the landowner, the share of the hunting plot that is open land (i.e., not forested land) is included. 1 Even though the forest provides a suitable biome for wild species, the ecological literature suggests that habitat variation could increase the number of species present, since species have different habitat preferences (Tews et al. 2004 ). Meilby et al. (2006) argue that both hunters and wildlife prefer a diverse vegetation, as diversity creates niches for different wildlife. Their results suggest that more open, broadleaf-dominated forests are conducive for hunting and aesthetic purposes (Meilby et al. 2006 ). In addition, agricultural crops are a popular feeding source for some species, in particular the fallow deer and the wild boar. Therefore, we hypothesize that the relationship between the open land share and lease prices will defined by an inverted U-shape. The intuition is that some intermediate level of open land may be most conducive for hunting.
The variable represents the number of A it hunters in a hunting team and can be seen as a measure of the congestion effect (Conlin, Dickert-Conlin, and Pepper 2009) . A large number of hunters implies that the freedom of the individual hunters to choose the time and location for hunting is reduced. Also, it increases the need for negotiations between the hunter team members on hunting strategies and rules for sharing game meat and costs for habitat management. We therefore hypothesize that a larger team implies a lower lease price. Notably, Lundhede, Jacobsen, and Thorsen (2015) argue that although hunting is a social activity and hunters enjoy the company of others, large hunting teams may not be preferred by the landowner due to possible damages from human activities to agriculture and forest crops. The consequence of this would be that the land owner demands a higher compensation for the lease, and their study confirms such a positive impact on the lease price. However, we believe that although such effects might be found in more densely populated countries such as Denmark, it is less likely to be an issue in Sweden.
To account for structural differences between municipalities where the hunting plots are located, we include as covariate a vector of municipality characteristics , namely, M it the mean disposable income in the municipality, and a dummy variable indicating whether the municipality is urban or otherwise. A higher average income could be expected to generate a higher demand for hunting plots and hence to be positively related to lease price. Urban municipalities tend to be more densely populated, and less of the land might suitable for hunting, which could affect the demand in a similar manner.
Thus, , , , , and are vectors of α β ϕ γ φ parameters to be estimated. Finally, is the ε it error term that captures the effect of unobserved variables, assumed to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables.
Empirical Strategy
A possible threat to identification in model (1) is if any of the explanatory variables is endogenous. This could result from either measurement errors or simultaneity between the explanatory variable and dependent variable. While many of the explanatory variables in our reduced-form model can be justified to be exogenous, the issue has been raised whether a high lease price could reduce harvests. However, we think it is unlikely that this would happen. First, all hunting plots in our dataset remain leased to the same hunter team over time, in other words, there is no impact on the quantity of leased hunting land. Second, even if the hunting plot is leased by a hunter team at a high price, the lease price is a sunk cost, which will not affect the hunters' optimal choice of harvest unless the hunters are financially constrained. If hunters are financially constrained, a high lease price could reduce the hunters' financial budget, leaving less money to pay for the cost of the hunting effort. The hunting effort is largely determined by hunting equipment and the time spent hunting. Much of the hunters' financial costs for hunting (apart from the lease) are costs for investments in equipment necessary for the hunt, such as hunting weapons, riflescopes, and gun cabinets. In the short run, such investments are also sunk costs. Thus, the time spent hunting is likely to be the most important determinant of the size of the harvest in the short run. It is not obvious that the opportunity cost of leisure time spent hunting would change to any significant extent in response to a higher lease price. We therefore do not think that endogeneity is a problem in our case study, which looks only at short-term effects. The issue could potentially be different if long-term effects are considered.
Another issue that requires attention is that of the timing of price determination versus the timing of harvest. Hunters and land owners agree on a lease price for a given hunting season before the harvests of that season have been realized. We think it is reasonable to assume that hunters have expectations for harvests in a given hunting season that build on both harvests in the foregoing season and observations of wildlife during the foregoing season and in the spring and summer between seasons. Hunters have many opportunities to observe wildlife when they carry out habitat management activities, spend leisure time on the hunting plot, or hunt but do not shoot the game because it is too far away. We therefore believe that at the team level, hunters are able to predict harvests in the coming hunting season relatively well. 2 We therefore assume that harvests in year t equal harvests expected by the hunters, and positively correlate with the lease price in the same year. 3 As a robustness check, we complement the analysis with an estimation of the model with lagged harvest values. In that case, it is implicitly assumed that hunters build their beliefs about the current year's harvest solely on last years observed harvests. If we believe that endogeneity is still likely to occur when contemporaneous harvest is used (in spite of the arguments presented above) then the use of lagged harvest values should also help to overcome this issue. Thus the identification assumption is then .
Further, the literature on hedonic pricing models reveals that amenity values are often influenced by spatial spillover effects (Brasington and Hite 2005). For example, trends in the lease market in one area may have spillover effects on markets in neighboring areas and vice versa. This is because, when a given plot is put on the lease market, its offer price is set within the knowledge of lease price(s) of other hunting plots in the neighborhood. In the same way, bid prices are influenced by bids on neighboring lands (Brasington and Hite 2005) . This observation is consistent with the assumption of agents in the lease market being price takers. Closely related to the above are concerns about the influence of temporal or spatial spillovers in game populations on lease prices. Even though wildlife populations are not directly accounted for in the model, they could potentially induce spatial correlation in the residuals of our estimated hedonic price function, as wildlife populations on the own hunting plot, as well as in the neighborhood region, could matter for the lease price. Thus, estimating a hedonic model such as equation [1] without controlling for possible spatial effects might lead to spurious results. These two factors both motivate the use of a spatial model.
The empirical approach of our study can be summarized as follows. First, we estimate the model outlined in equation [1] using the nonspatial pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) approach. However, as indicated earlier, the OLS approach is unable to account for the effects of spatial interactions in the model estimated. Hence, as a second step, we test for the possibility of any spatial effects in the model using the Moran's I test for spatial autocorrelation and the Lagrange multiplier test of spatial dependence. The confirmation of spatial autocorrelation provides the basis for proceeding to estimate a spatial panel hedonic price model using two alternative spatial models: the spatial-autoregressive with spatially auto-correlated error (SARAR) model and the spatial error (SE) model. Results from the three models are then compared to see the effects of accounting for spatial effects in the model on the estimated parameters. As a final step, the average marginal implicit values are estimated to determine the hunter's average marginal willingness to pay (WTP) for harvesting one additional unit of each game species
The SARAR Model
Spatial effects in hedonic pricing models can occur via two channels: first, through amenity prices, whereby prices of an amenity in neighboring localities can exert upward or downward pressure on the price of the same amenity in a particular location; second, when certain unobserved factors or omitted variables that affect amenity prices are correlated over space. This results in spatially correlated residuals. Therefore to account for these two possible channels of spatial autocorrelation in a model simultaneously, the SARAR model has been proposed. Implicitly, this model is a combination of the spatial-lag (SAR) model and the SE model. On the one hand, the SAR model assumes that the lease price of a particular hunting plot is determined not only by the explanatory variables included in equation [1] (i.e., direct effects) but in addition is influenced by the weighted average of the lease price in the neighborhood region (i.e., indirect effects) (Won, Phipps, and Anselin 2003) . On the other hand, the SE model assumes that the error terms of the hedonic price equation are spatially correlated, due to omitted variables that are spatially correlated (Won, Phipps, and Anselin 2003) . For example, omitted variables such as game populations may be spatially correlated due to species' migratory patterns.
Thus, the SARAR model assumes spatial autocorrelation in both the dependent variable and the error terms. Also, the SARAR model is a fairly general model in the sense that it allows for spatial spillovers in the dependent variable as well as the residuals. The mathematical representation of the SARAR model can be expressed as
where y is the dependent variable; X and β represent, respectively, a vector of explanatory variables and the associated estimated coefficients; and represents the spatially W y 1 weighted dependent variable (lease price). The associated coefficient , that is, the spa-λ tial autoregressive parameter, measures the extent to which the price of one plot is af-fected by the prices of the plots in neighboring communities. This may also be interpreted as an information effect, in the sense that if hunters are unsure of the appropriate lease value of a particular plot given its attributes, they may infer from the value of neighboring plots (cf. Jensen, Panduro, and Lundhede 2014 weighting matrices associated with the spatial lag process and spatial error process, respectively (Murray and Simcox 2003) . In this study, the same weighing matrix is used for both processes, as commonly done in the literature. Constructing the spatial weight matrix can be done using contiguity, k-nearest neighbors, or the inverse-distance approaches. There is no formal approach in deciding the choice of the weighting matrix (Anselin 1988b ). Therefore, weighting matrices were constructed using the contiguity approach. For a detailed exposition on the construction of the weighting matrix and estimation of spatial regressions, interested readers may refer to Anselin (1988b) , Anselin and Bera (1998) , Drukker (2009), and Millo and Piras (2012) . Further, we complement the analysis by estimating a SE model, which basically results when we restrict in equation [2] . λ = 0
Implicit Prices
From an estimated hedonic price function, implicit prices for each attribute (regressor) can be computed by taking the partial derivative of the hedonic price function with respect to the attribute. The main variables of interest in this study are the harvest of the game species. As a result, implicit values are computed for each game species, which constitutes the average marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) for each. Therefore, from equation [1] implicit values for game species can be obtained by taking the partial derivative, as shown in equation [3] :
h ∂H where refers to the willingness to MWTP h pay for the respective hunted game species.
However, it must be emphasized that the above approach for estimating implicit prices does not apply directly to spatial models, as the coefficients of explanatory variables do not capture the impact of a change in the independent variable on the dependent variable. To interpret the SARAR model (2), we first express the model in its reduced form as 
∂X′
The expression in [5] constitutes the total impact of a change in any of the independent variables on the dependent variable. The total impact is the sum of the direct and indirect (induced) impacts. The direct impact estimate measures the effect of a change in an explanatory variable in neighborhood i on the dependent variable in the same neighborhood. The indirect impact, however, captures the effect of a change in an independent variable on the dependent variable in neighborhood j ( ). ∀j ≠ ì
Data and Study Area
This study uses data on hunting lease prices, hunting plot characteristics, and socioeconomic characteristics of hunting teams in Sweden over three hunting seasons: 2010/ 2011, 2011/2012, and 2012/2013 . Data on hunting lease prices, land characteristics, land ownership, size of hunting team, and roe and fallow deer harvests were collected through telephone interviews with chairs of local hunt-ing associations, 4 carried out in the spring of 2013. The selection of hunting associations to include in the survey was based on the presence of fallow deer within the region covered by the association. This need not imply that fallow deer are present on the hunting plot leased by the person interviewed, namely, the chair of the association. The choice to interview chairs was determined by that fact that in most cases it was possible to find contact details such as names, telephone number, or e-mail address from the local hunting association's home page. With a single exception, all subjects contacted responded to all questions. We must emphasize that even though chairs of the hunting associations were interviewed, we elicited information only on their respective hunting teams and not the entire association. Because we interviewed the chair of local hunting associations, the resulting dataset includes only hunting leases for hunters that hunt in the vicinity of their home and have lease contracts on an annual basis, as is also the case for most land in Sweden. This implies that we are not able to evaluate the possible role of the distance between a hunter's home and the hunting plot, or the role of different types of lease contracts, for the lease price paid. In addition to this, we have only a single observation per municipality, and not all municipalities are covered, implying that the physical distance between our observed plots can be considerable. After data cleaning, data on 43 hunting teams in 43 different municipalities were considered relevant for the analysis. Using data over the three hunting seasons, we arrive at a total sample of 129 observations. Admittedly, the relatively small size of our sample poses some asymptotic problems, notably the small sample bias.
Data on wild boar and moose harvests per hunting team were obtained from the Wildlife Database. 5 This database contains information on harvests as reported on a voluntary basis by different hunting teams. From it, we extract the bag rates, which are the number of wild boar and moose shot per hectare in each year in the local hunter association's area that 4 Belonging to the Swedish Hunters Association. 5 See www.viltdata.se. corresponds to our hunting plots. For 10 of our locations, moose harvest reports on the local hunting association level were deemed to be of insufficient quality. 6 For those, we used the county administrations' data for the moose management areas, for the nearest higher spatial aggregation level, where the coverage of moose harvests is complete. These bag rates are then used to calculate a proxy for the harvest at the respective hunting plots.
The distance to the nearest big city was calculated as the distance from the major urban center in the municipality to the nearest of the three largest Swedish cities: Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö. Further, we do not have plot-level spatial data, and given the fact that our dataset consist of one hunting team per municipality, we utilize the geographical information of the municipalities rather than the specific plots. Thus we consider spatial variations in the lease prices of hunting plots across municipalities rather than within municipalities.
Data on average disposable income for each municipality was obtained from Statistics Sweden, while the urban classification was obtained from the Swedish Rural Development Agency (Glesbygdsverket 2008) . The monetary variables, namely, lease price and income, are converted to real values in 2015 prices.
Descriptive statistics of the variables used are summarized in Table 1 . Also, a test of multicollinearity among the explanatory variables is conducted and shown in the Appendix (Table A1). The rule of thumb is that multicollinearity is present in a model if the variance inflation factor (VIF) exceeds 10. The results suggest that multicollinearity is not a problem in our model, as none of the VIF estimates is close to 10.
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Our point of departure in this section is the estimation of the hedonic price model via a nonspatial panel model (pooled OLS) ap- proach; to test for spatial dependence in the model; and to further estimate two spatial panel models (SARAR and SE) upon identification of spatial spillovers. Parameter estimates from the spatial and nonspatial models are compared to examine the effects of accounting for spatial interactions in the model on the estimation outcome. The departure toward a spatial econometric analysis of the data must be premised on evidence of the presence of spatial effects in the model being analyzed. To this end, we conduct some basic diagnostic tests for spatial dependence in the estimated OLS model(s) using the Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests for spatial dependence in the residuals and lagged dependent variable. The LM tests have been shown in the literature to be superior to variant tests such as the Wald and the likelihood ratio tests (Anselin 1988a (Anselin , 1988b . The LMerror and LM-lag tests examine, respectively, the effect of excluding a spatially lagged error and dependent variable on the model specification. Further, a test for spatial dependence is conducted using the well-known Moran's I test for spatial autocorrelation. Results are shown in Table 2 .
Results on the LM tests for spatial dependence suggest significant spatial dependence in the model, and thus exclusion of such interdependence, as in the OLS model, may result in biased estimates. This result is corroborated by the Moran's I test. This evidence of spatial autocorrelation at least in the residuals of the OLS model provides enough justification for estimating the spatial hedonic price models.
Also, results of the two spatial models estimated, as shown in Table 2 , unequivocally attest to the presence of significant spatial autocorrelation in both the lagged dependent variable and residuals, as represented by λ and , respectively. Both parameters are sta-ρ tistically significant and fall between − 1 and 1. Considering the SARAR model, the coefficient of the spatially lagged dependent variable ( ) is positive and significant at the 1% λ level, implying a positive spatial correlation in the hunting lease prices. On the other hand, the results on the spatially weighted residuals in both SARAR and SE models suggest that some unobservable or omitted variables in the model that are spatially correlated have a negative effect on lease prices.
Turning our attention to the covariates, there are slight differences between the results of the spatial and nonspatial models. The differences are largely found in the statistical significance of the regressors, as the parameter estimates are within the same neighborhood.
From the results, the distance of a hunting plot to the nearest large city is shown to be inversely related to lease prices, indicating that hunting plots located near large cities attract higher prices relative to plots at distant locations. This is an expected result given the high population density and higher income in the large cities, implying a higher demand for hunting plots within shorter traveling distance. Similar results are obtained by Liven- Note: Standard errors in parentheses; OLS standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. Number of observations is 129. Time fixed effects are applied in all models. Dependent variable is log of real price per hectare. LM-error, the Lagrange multiplier test for spatial dependence in the error term; LM-lag, the Lagrange multiplier test for spatial dependence in the lagged dependent variable; OLS, ordinary least squares; SARAR, spatial autoregressive with a spatial autoregressive error term; SE, spatial error.
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
good (1983) and Little and Berrens (2008) . The effect of the size of hunting plot on the lease price is inconsistent in terms of sign and significance across the various specifications estimated. Hunter congestion appears to be an issue for hunting lease pricing. Proxied by the number of hunters in a hunting team, our result shows a negative impact of the number of hunters in a team on lease prices. This could suggest that congestion can imply a disadvantage to hunters, as suggested above. However, it must be emphasized that the result is not robust, as the variable loses significance after accounting for spatial effects.
Results suggest a positive relationship between income level and price, and between urban municipalities and price, even though the income variable is not significant across the various specifications. Our interpretation is that hunting leases tend to be highly priced in high-income and urban localities because of both a smaller supply of agricultural and forest land and higher competition among prospective hunters seeking to gain access to plots for hunting.
Further, we do not find any consistent and statistically significant relationship between the ownership of the hunting plot and the lease price. Hence, the assertion that forest companies are able to exert market power cannot be validated, at least based on our dataset.
Our results do not lend support to the notion of a nonlinear relationship between the share of open land and the hunting lease price. Instead, we find a negative relationship, showing that hunting lease prices decrease in the share of open land; in other words, a larger forest share is preferred. This is contrary to our expectations. However, we do not have detailed data on vegetation types, and hence, we are unable to fully account for habitat diversity in our model.
The moose harvest is statistically insignificant in both the spatial and nonspatial models except in one instance where we observe a negative and significant relationship. This indicates that the moose harvest is not a significant determinant of the variation in hunting lease prices in the study area. The result is somewhat unexpected, given that moose is the most valuable game in the Scandinavian countries (Olaussen and Skonhoft 2011) . The particular regulations for moose hunting may explain this. Unlike the other game species, regulations require moose hunting to be carried out in cooperation among several hunting teams, sometimes across municipalities. Within such so-called moose management areas, several hunting teams are together allocated a given number of moose that they are allowed to, and obliged to, harvest. Once harvested, the moose meat is allocated among the members of all hunting teams that hunt moose together. This implies that moose harvests are not clearly related to supply and demand for hunting leases at the hunting plot level. In addition, the relatively limited number of observations could matter for the lack of significance. The roe deer harvest is also insignificant in our model. The rapid decline in the roe deer population over the last decade might partly explain this, as these changes may not have been fully reflected in lease prices.
Harvest of fallow deer and wild boar are significant in all the variant models estimated. We therefore conclude that they are key determinants of hunting lease prices in southern Sweden.
Finally, concerns about the appropriateness of using contemporaneous harvest data in the estimation of our hedonic price function are evaluated by conducting a placebo test to see how our results change in the presence of lagged harvest. Results of this exercise (see Appendix Table A2 ) suggest that the choice between contemporaneous and lagged harvest does not have any significant impact on the effect of harvests on hunting lease prices and, consequently, the implicit prices associated with each species.
Average Marginal Implicit Prices
We calculate the implicit prices of game harvests using parameter estimates from the spatial and nonspatial models. Based on the results of the LM tests for spatial dependence, the SARAR model is preferred to the SE model, and therefore implicit prices are computed using estimates from the former.
In a spatial regression framework, the computation of implicit values requires estimation of the associated impact (direct, indirect, and (Anselin 1988b; Anselin and Bera 1998; Drukker 2009 ). We are particularly interested in computing the direct and indirect impacts of variations in game harvest to analyze the associated implicit prices. For purposes of statistical inference, implicit values are estimated only for variables with significant direct impact estimates, namely, fallow deer and wild boar. The indirect impact estimates are not used in the computation of the implicit prices because such spillover effects do not necessarily accurately reflect the preference of the hunters, as they may not foresee the indirect effects of their bids (Jensen, Panduro, and Lundhede 2014) . Table 3 presents the direct, indirect, and total impact estimates associated with column 5 of Table 2 .
In line with the results in Table 2 , the results in Table 3 show that only fallow deer and wild boar harvests have significant direct impact estimates. Therefore, to compute the implicit prices for fallow deer and wild boar we utilize the direct impact estimates in Table 3 and the OLS estimates 8 in Table 2 . Results of the implicit price calculations are shown in Table 4 .
The estimates suggest that hunters attach considerable value to fallow deer and wild boar hunting. There are no comparable estimates for fallow deer, but compared to results 7 However, the SE model is an exception. Here, the total and direct effects coincide with the coefficients of the β estimated models.
8 Specifically column 2.
from the choice experiment presented by Engelmann, Lagerkvist, and Gren (2016), our estimate of the value of wild boar is about seven times larger.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This paper presents an empirical analysis of hunting lease pricing and the economic value associated with hunting of game species in Sweden, using the hedonic pricing model. The analysis is conducted using spatial and nonspatial econometric techniques. The analysis reveals significant spatial spillovers in lease prices, confirming the importance of accounting for spatial effects on hunting lease markets in order to avoid inefficient and inconsistent estimates of model parameters.
Our results also show that congestion effects, the distance of the hunting plot to urban centers, the location of the hunting plot, and harvest rates are significant factors driving hunting lease prices in Sweden. The study reveals significant and considerable marginal implicit prices associated with the hunting of fallow deer and wild boar: the hunting value of fallow deer lies in the range of $287 to $324 per animal harvested, and the hunting value of wild boar is estimated to be between $279 and $290 per animal harvested. Further, results show that a naïve estimate that fails to account for spatial autocorrelation in the lease prices may underestimate the value of game species by between 4% and 13%.
The existence of considerable hunting values raises the question of whether there is motivation to take measures to increase the populations of the species. The fallow deer is a sedentary species that occurs in relatively few locations and has a low natural dispersal rate (Bergström and Danell 2009) . Hypothetically, the establishment of viable fallow deer populations in additional locations could be beneficial to society. 9 However, to evaluate whether this is the case, it would be necessary to have further knowledge on other costs and benefits associated with such deliberate dispersal, including, for example, crop damage and impacts on biodiversity. Currently, holdings of fenced domesticated fallow deer can be eligible for environmental support from the Board of Agriculture when kept on natural grazing land. Such support is motivated by the positive impact on biodiversity. This indicates the possible existence of a similar positive biodiversity effect of wild fallow deer. For wild boar, the situation is different. The species has dispersed rapidly over the last decades (Bergström and Danell 2009) , and although this is appreciated by hunters, the associated increases in crop damage (Clarin and Karlsson 2010) and traffic accidents ) are considered to be problematic. Deliberate efforts to increase and 9 Notably, deliberate dispersal of wild species is not legally permitted.
spread the species could thus have considerable negative side effects.
Our study has limitations, which should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. The dataset is small, and hunting plots and respondents are not randomly chosen from a larger population. This implies a risk for selection bias, but it is not obvious that this is a problem for our results. Also, the use of selfreported data may induce some biases. Similar to earlier studies on hunting leases, we are not able to disentangle the different roles of wildlife abundance and wildlife harvests for the lease price, due to the lack of population data. Also, we lack data on hunter income, which can have an important role for the opportunity cost of hunting and hence for harvests at the hunting plot level. Further, we do not explicitly investigate the market structure of hunting leases, or the possible existence of market power on equilibrium lease prices. The latter is potentially important for lease prices, given considerable hunting values in combination with the relative difficulties for new hunters without access to hunting plots to find hunting opportunities. These are possible areas for future research. 
APPENDIX
(8)
Size ( 
0.874
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; OLS standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. Number of observations is 86. Time fixed effects are applied in all models. Dependent variable is the log of real price per hectare. Moose, fallow, boar, and roe harvests are in logs. OLS, ordinary least squares; SARAR, spatial autoregressive with a spatial autoregressive error term; SE spatial error; LM-error, the Lagrange multiplier test for spatial dependence in the error term; LM-lag, the Lagrange multiplier test for spatial dependence in the lagged dependent variable. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
